Florida Law Review
Volume 5

Issue 3

Article 10

September 1952

Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative
Defense in Answer
Albert P. Schwarz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Albert P. Schwarz, Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative Defense in Answer, 5
Fla. L. Rev. 340 (1952).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss3/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Schwarz: Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative D

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Sep 8 11:50:37 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Albert P. Schwarz, Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative
Defense in Answer, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 340 (1952).
ALWD 7th ed.
Albert P. Schwarz, Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative
Defense in Answer, 5 U. Fla. L. Rev. 340 (1952).
APA 7th ed.
Schwarz, A. P. (1952). Practice and procedure: necessity of reply to avoid
affirmative defense in answer. University of Florida Law Review, 5(3), 340-343.
Chicago 17th ed.
Albert P. Schwarz, "Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative
Defense in Answer," University of Florida Law Review 5, no. 3 (Fall 1952): 340-343
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Albert P. Schwarz, "Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative
Defense in Answer" (1952) 5:3 U Fla L Rev 340.
AGLC 4th ed.
Albert P. Schwarz, 'Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative
Defense in Answer' (1952) 5(3) University of Florida Law Review 340
MLA 9th ed.
Schwarz, Albert P. "Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative
Defense in Answer." University of Florida Law Review, vol. 5, no. 3, Fall 1952, pp.
340-343. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Albert P. Schwarz, 'Practice and Procedure: Necessity of Reply to Avoid Affirmative
Defense in Answer' (1952) 5 U Fla L Rev 340
Provided by:
University of Florida / Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1952

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1952], Art. 10
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
relief upon roughly analogous circumstances absent the factor of
actual notice, but that court was probably motivated by the fact that
the optionee had made improvements worth S10,000. Logically, the
improvements should not have been considered, since they were imposed upon the optionee by the terms of the lease, and so constituted
part of the consideration for the lease and option.
In the instant case the Florida Court, feeling that the equities
favored the lessees, has adopted a liberal but clearly a minority view.
Because the granting of relief to optionees in spite of their failure to
comply strictly with the conditions precedent of proper and timely
notice is a matter of discretion, it is impossible to say that the decision is incorrect. The result seems unwise, however, when the facts
presented in the dissent are considered, because it favors slipshod
conduct of legal affairs over the strict construction which an option
by its nature should be given.
JUSTIN C.

MONTGOMERY

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: NECESSITY OF REPLY TO
AVOID AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN ANSWER
Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 59 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1952)
Plaintiff brought suit to recover on a life insurance policy of which
she was beneficiary. The defendant in filing its answer asserted the
affirmative defense of fraud in the procurement of the policy. No
other pleadings were filed. At the trial the plaintiff relied principally
on evidence establishing the defense of waiver or estoppel. Defendant's seasonable objection to this evidence on the ground that it
was immaterial and irrelevant to any issue raised in the pleadings
was overruled by the trial judge. On appeal after a verdict for
plaintiff, HELD, the evidence of waiver or estoppel was improperly
admitted, since those defenses were not raised in the pleadings by
a reply, as provided by Florida Common Law Rule 8 (a). Judgment
reversed, Justices Chapman, Roberts, and Mathews dissenting.
At common law and in Florida until quite recently the system
of pleading with which most Florida practitioners are more familiar,
and in some cases understandably reluctant to relinquish, contemplated successive pleading by each party alternatively until an issue was
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reached upon which one party assumed the affirmative and the other
the negative.1 In order to avoid the delay inherent in this system,
code procedures have, generally speaking, limited pleadings to a
complaint and an answer. In a minority of code states, which apparently retain an affinity for the common law, a reply is necessary
in order to deny2 or to avoid 3 new matter contained in the answer,
though at least one has no provision for a replication or reply. 4 The
majority of code states, however, require a reply to new matter only
when ordered by the court, either on its own motion or on motion
of the defendant.5 If a reply is not ordered, the new matter or affirmative defense set up by the answer is "taken as denied or avoided."
This simplification in pleading is a result of the trend toward "notice"
pleading as opposed to the technical forms necessary at common law.
To augment the simplified pleading the codes established the discovery processes7 and the pretrial conference.8
In federal practice, Rule 7 (a) contemplates that in the normal
situation the pleadings shall consist of no more than a complaint and
an answer. 9 To enable a party plaintiff to avoid an affirmative defense
a reply is not required,' 0 but one may be ordered by the court. 11 Al'See Livingston v. Anderson, 30 Fla. 117, 125, 11 So. 270, 272 (1892). FLA. STAT.
§51.07 (1941), repealed by Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26962, permitted the plaintiff to file
as many replications or subsequent pleadings to any pleading of the defendant
as he desired; but the old Common Law Rule 38, 122 Fla. 881, 895, adopted April
27, 1936, provided for an automatic denial of the allegations in a preceding
pleading.
21LL. ANN. STAT. C. 110, §156 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1951); IND. ANN. STAT. §2-1026
(Burns Supp. 1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §60-717 (Corrick Supp. 1951); MINN.
STAT. §544.08 (1949); OHIO GaN. CODE ANN. §11326 (Supp. 1951); ORE. COMP.
LAws ANN. §1-715 (Supp. 1947); WAsH. REv. CODE §4.32.210 (1951).
3
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 104, c. 11, §1 (1943).
4CAl. CODE Civ. Paoc. §422 (Supp. 1951).
5E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §274; N.C. GE. STAT. §1-141 (Supp. 1951); N.D.
REv. CODE §28-0716 (Supp. 1947); S.C. CODE §471 (Supp. 1948).
6E.g., FED. R. Cirv. PROC. 8(d); FLA. C.L.R. 9(e); N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-159 (Supp.

1951); N.D. REv. CODE §28-0717 (Supp. 1947).
7See Mehrtens, Deposition and Discovery in Florida under the Federal Rules,
1 U. OF FI". L. REv. 149 (1948).
8See Chillingworth and White, Pretrial Conference in Florida, 4 U. OF FLA.
L. REv. 141, 144 (1951).
DAmerican Cutting Alloys, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 135 F.2d 502 (2d Cir.
1943); Bower v. Casanave, 44 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).

l0jordan v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 77 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Mo.
1948).
"'Bankers Bond & Mtge. Co. v. Witherow, 1 F.R.D. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
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though the court's power to order a reply is not limited to an answer
containing new matter, some restraint is shown in refusals to order
unnecessary replies.1 2 Since a reply is not compulsory, its insufficiency
will not support a motion for judgment on the pleadings," though
the allegations made may be treated as admissions against the interest
of the pleader.' 4 The limitation imposed on the use of the reply by
Rule 7 (a) enables the parties to arrive at an issue expeditiously and
protects the plaintiff against the risk formerly involved in analyzing
the answer to determine whether a defense is affirmative in character."s
For the purpose of initial analysis Florida Common Law Rule
8 (a) will be compared with its federal counterpart discussed above.' 6
Both rules contemplate that the pleadings will normally conclude
with the answer. Therefore the principal point of divergence is in
the requirement of a reply. 1'7 Under the federal rule the phrase
"may order a reply" indicates that discretion is given to the trial
court, and by interpretation no reply is required unless ordered by
the court.' 8 The language of the Florida rule, "shall permit a reply,"
does not sound in discretion but presupposes that in a proper case a
reply must be allowed when requested. This language is not necessarily inappropriate if coupled with a provision casting upon the defendant the burden of requesting a reply,19 but the Florida rule inferentially designates the plaintiff as the party from whom the application for a reply should come. This feature is questionable, since
the reply is primarily for the benefit of the defendant, and it should
be his obligation to request one or waive the right to have it.
"2Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 4 F.R.D. 294 (M.D. Pa. 1945).
'3Geist v. Prudential Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
"4See Middle West Constr. Co. v. Metropolitan Dist., 2 F.R.D. 117 (D. Conn.
1941).
15Phoenix-Apollo Steel Co. v. Atlas Tack Corp., 9 F.R.D. 454 (D. Mass. 1949);
see O'Keefe v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 App. Div. 141, 145, 12 N.Y.S.2d 31, 36
(Ist Dep't 1939) (dissenting opinion).
16The rule originally proposed was almost identical with the federal rule,
Proposed Common Law Rules, 22 FLA. L.J. 120, 122 (1948).
'7Completely omitted from this discussion is the use of the reply to a counterclaim or cross-claim. In such cases it is substantially an answer to an independent
cause of action.
IsCompare Jordan v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 77 F. Supp. 817
(W.D. Mo. 1948), with the instant case.
19Under the usual code provision relating to the permissive reply, the defendant
must make such application, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PAc. AcT §274; S.C. CODE §471
(Supp. 1948).
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Upon arriving at these rather basic conclusions, two questions
arise: Is there imposed on the plaintiff the responsibility of determining the proper case in which a reply is necessary; and, when is a reply
necessary? The language of the instant case leaves little room for
speculation on the answer to the first question. A plaintiff must make
application to the court for permission to reply when necessary, and
the responsibility of determining the proper case is his. This interpretation of the rule, though warranted, precludes the relief from
this responsibility given pleaders by the federal rule.20 As will be
seen in the following discussion, the second question cannot be fully
answered.
Rule 8 (a) specifically provides that the court shall permit a reply
to meet affirmative defenses. The defenses referred to are logically
those in Rule 9 (d). The enumeration is of some assistance in determining what constitutes an affirmative defense, but it is important
to remember that the rule includes not only those defenses specifically
named but also any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. But when is a reply "necessary"? The averments
in a pleading are taken as denied or avoided when a responsive pleading is neither required nor permitted. 21 To affirmative averments in
an answer, however, a responsive pleading is permitted. Therefore,
by the strict language of the rules neither the automatic avoidance
nor denial is applicable, and a reply is necessary even to deny an affirmative defense. 22 The decision of the instant case, however, is
apparently based more on the necessity that the pleadings inform
the opposing party of all the issues to be tried rather than upon a
strict interpretation of the rules; it is unlikely that the Court would
require a reply merely to deny affirmative averments. Although the
drafters of the rules did not contemplate the necessity of such a denial,
the need for a revision of the present rule to eliminate this possible
interpretation is dear.
Assuming, then, that a reply is necessary only when the plaintiff
desires to avoid an affirmative defense, it is possible that even then
a reply may not always be required. 23 It cannot be fairly said that
20See note 15 supra.

21F"a C.L.tL 9 (e).

22The opposite interpretation could be reached. Set out in syllogistic form
it is: (1) The reply to affirmative defense is permitted only when necessary; (2)

a reply merely for the purpose of denial is not necessary; (3) the reply is not
permitted and the automatic denial is applicable.
23See Fitch v. Weir, 208 App. Div. 630, 203 N.Y. Supp. 904 (Ist Dep't 1924),
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